If you’re following the trade deadline for the past couple years, you’ve noticed how valuable prospects have become.  Even non-elite prospects are guarded with the ferocity of Cerberus by GMs who realize that having 6 years cost-controlled mediocrity is better than short-term, higher-cost, low-efficiency options.  Sure, these veterans tend to be better than the younger options, but in a world where you’re compelled to buy victories, it’s better to save money at the margins to make a big splash on a difference-making player.

Not only has this led to the extreme valuation of prospects that not every GM has caught up on (hello Ed Wade!), but it has also slowed down the deadline considerably as teams are struggling to find acceptable deals for their high-priced veterans.  As a result, these GMs are holding their vets for a bit longer, hoping to snooker some desperate GM at the last minute.  Of course, any decision like this has unintended consequences, as Dayton Moore, Doug Melvin, and Billy Beane are finding out. The risk of holding on to players like David DeJesus, Corey Hart, and Ben Sheets too long is that sometimes players get hurt.

Indeed, DeJesus and Sheets look like they’re out for the year, and Hart has not played since jamming his wrist on Friday.  As a result, the Royals and A’s, and perhaps the Brewers as well, will not be able to acquire new talent for organizations in desperate need of it.  The compulsion for GMs to find the best deal, the perfect deal, has gotten so great that GMs are making no deal until they are forced, which often is taking the actual choice out of their hands.

In this new economy of prospects, GMs seem to have two options.

The first option is to take whatever they can get for what they have.  Rather than waiting for the perfect deal to develop (which it looks like it never did for the Diamondbacks and Dan Haren), GMs may simply need to choose the best of a bunch of imperfect options, accepting that not every deal can net you a Justin Smoak.  This acknowledgement allows GMs to infuse at least some talent back into the team for a player who is not likely to contribute to the next winning season.  This kind of deal especially makes sense for the Ben Sheetses and the Jose Guillens of the world, who are slated to be free agents, especially if they are unlikely to generate compensation draft picks when they depart.

The other option that more GMs may need to accept is simply holding onto their veterans for as long as possible.  For one thing, even with the advancement in scouting and performance analysis that has happened over the last several seasons, the business of predicting prospects’ futures is still somewhat of a crapshoot.  The Marlins were generally praised in 2008 when they received blue-chip players Cameron Maybin and Andrew Miller (plus four other players) for Miguel Cabrera and Dontrelle Willis.  Since then, Miller has a 5.43 ERA for the Marlins and currently has a 5.52 ERA at AA this year while trying to rebuild his value.  Maybin has hit .225/.290/.341 this year in 201 plate appearances for the Fish.  Smoak himself is hitting .203/.297/.346 between Texas and Seattle, and has actually hit worse (.176/.192/.314) for the M’s.  In this new economy, veterans who still contribute value to a team are actually undervalued, and teams who try to squeeze as much value as possible out of veterans like Adrian Gonzalez will outperform teams that are devoted to youth.

Prior to this year, everyone and their mother was anticipating the Padres’ need to unload Gonzalez before he bolted as a free agent in 2012.  The Padres weren’t going anywhere, and had Kyle Blanks ready to plug in at 1B.  Since then, of course, Blanks stumbled out of the gate (.157/.283/.324), got hurt, and hasn’t played since late May.  Meanwhile, led by Gonzalez and a dynamite pitching staff, the Pads have scrapped to a three game lead over the Giants in the NL West.  Rather than maximize the return they could have gotten for Gonzalez (a return that is lower than they would have gotten, say, two years ago given the inflation in prospect value), they chose a different path and are winning because of it.  Perhaps there is a lesson there for Ed Wade and other GMs looking to unload players under their control beyond 2010.  You simply are not likely to get back what these players are worth, especially if you can build a club around them in the meantime.

The Common Man blogs on his own site 2-3 times a week, and you can also follow him on Twitter.